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1 According to some, the awareness of the constitutional deficit began in 1992
and consider that such an ‘awareness’ coincides with the discussion concerning the
democratic deficit that opened immediately after Maastricht, while according to others,
it began with the constitutional discussion phase of 1993-1994; yet others point to
2000. In this text reference is made to the months between June 2003 and May 2004. 
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1. For a short period of time, more limited and symbolically in-
tense than several schools of historians of integration lead us to
think1, there was a widespread opinion that an unprecedented phase
of European constitutionalism had begun as a result of the political
alchemies of the Convention, all to the advantage of the consolidation
and visibility of the Union. Several points need to be clarified right
away: in the first place, the concept of «constitutionalism» should be
understood in a broad sense, to avoid the risk of identifying it with
what concerns the history of the western constitutional state (Barbera
and Zanetti 1998), i.e. the history of that unitary or federal order, with
a national basis, sovereign yet founded on popular self-determination
and limited in the exercise of power by the inalienable rights of the
individuals who make up the people. It is only from this last perspec-
tive, which links power to the forms of its limitation by those who are
its source and raison d’être, that it is possible to ‘force’ and extend
the scope of the concept of constitutionalism to allow it to cross the
defining frontiers of the ‘state’. In the second place, the meaning
adopted here follows a clear-cut descent and tradition (Hobbesian-
Kantian), according to which, if it is true that individuals are the legit-
imising basis of power, it is equally true that they become citizens
solely through the constitution that they give themselves: only as indi-
viduals constituted institutionally in a body politic can they be de-
fined and act as the ultimate foundations of legitimate power. The
fact that citizens (at the same time authors and centres of social inter-
action) are the real constitutionally significant centres of action can-
2 This allows for a clear analogy with the formula of the ‘federal principle’ (Elazar
1979), principle that must not be mistaken for its specific manifestation in the federal
state, since it ‘expresses the search for unity by many institutional actors concomitantly
with a genuine respect for the autonomy and the interests of all the entities involved.’
(Weiler, in Zagrebelsky 2004, Loretoni 2000).
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not obscure the awareness that they are so through constitutional in-
stitutions. What is meant by the term ‘constitutionalism’ is that it de-
scribes the condition by which to the state – or to any other form of
polity – is given no more power than is conceded by the Constitution
(Pernice, Mayer, in Zagrebelsky 2004), the latter meant as much in a
formal sense, as a supreme source of legal compulsoriness, as in a ma-
terial sense, of subdivision, structuring and mutual limitation of the
organs of which the order system and its political and social form is
composed. The constitutional principle, thus broadened, potentially
embraces much more than the limitation and foundation of the state
order, which sprang from the revolutions of the modern era2. 
To this it should be added, in the third place, that the term «con-
stitutionalism» can legitimately indicate not only a framework of prin-
ciples and institutions for the limitation and the politico-institutional
consolidation of a polity, but also the process, the powers and the po-
litical energies through which such a framework is assessed and criti-
cised in the most diverse contexts by the citizens. Moreover, in the
particular case we are speaking about, the polity called «Union» is sui
generis, neither born historically out of the ashes of the nation-states
(Weiler 1999, Loretoni 2000), nor devised to replace them in the form
of a federal super-state, but differentiating itself from them in terms
of powers, claims to political legitimacy and to prevalence of sources
in specific legal and normative contexts. In the literature there are
those who consider the direct effect of European law on the citizens
of the states of the Union to be an established fact for many matters,
and those who also assert – although with a smaller following – the
primacy of community law over the constitutional law of the states. If,
moreover, we take as true the theory of a return to a content-based
and non-formalistic notion of constitution, we must recognize that in
the official documents, but also in the political sensibilities of thou-
sands of citizens of the member states, in the last few months an
awareness has grown that not only the language of rights but also its
codification into a document of constitutional rank – independent of
the state jurisdictions – has given birth to a substantive (and legally
enforceable) code of «morality and of conformity to principles in pol-
3 According to Grimm and Weiler, it cannot be so, given that the conditions are
lacking for the realization of a democracy in a material and not merely formal sense, i.e.
the preconditions for an adequate European public sphere, which represents the neces-
sary condition of all constitutional democratic states (Grimm). Let us add the final
point of those who have asserted the necessity of preventing the drafting and adoption
of a Constitution by the Union: for elevated reasons of constitutional and political tol-
erance it is well that this unprecedented politico-institutional entity should never be-
come a fully federal structure (Weiler). 
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itics». This means that informed public opinion has begun to define
and recognize a core of principles, values and norms characterizing
not only the drafts and the documents, but also the constitutional
identity, the quality that creates a ‘we’ from the point of view of the
structure and the fundamental processes of togetherness, and that is
prerequisite for the self-definition of the citizens of the Union as
forming a polity. Our Constitution, or more precisely, our politéia
(polity) is democracy, because «power is not in the hands of the few
but of the many». The words of Thucydides were chosen in the pre-
amble as the motto of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope, a document of which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union is an integral, constitutive part.
This is no longer the same old debate between scholars that has
been going on for about thirteen years about the existence of a Con-
stitution of the Union from the point of view of its structure and or-
ganisational functionality, according to which, in the opinion of some,
the European polity has been in every sense a legal order springing
from juridical acts (the Treaties), despite not having as its basis (until
very recently) a constitutional text, while in the opinion of others it
has had the organization, but not all the prerequisites, of an order
that is autonomous and distinct from the member states3. Such a de-
bate preceded and certainly influenced the phase of writing, discus-
sion and drawing up of the Draft Constitutional Treaty carried out by
the Convention, a phase that was already concluded on June 20 2003.
Yet it has lost much of its relevance to the present as well as its co-
gency. It could be objected that the stakes are quite different, consid-
ering how, immediately after the signing of the Constitutional Treaty,
some indignant voices were heard raising a further question, i.e. to
question the (substantively) constitutional status of the final docu-
ment. This was in the end so much less ambitious than the expecta-
tions of methodicalness, completeness, innovativeness and institution-
al functionality that had been reasonably and legitimately raised in
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scholars and European citizens. Such voices found an immediate echo
– inexplicable for many Euro-sceptics – in the consciences of many
young Europeans, generating widespread and intense discussion.
Nothing can make it clearer to us than this, as it should be already
clear from the reference to the Thucydidian motto, that the Constitu-
tion issue is a way of dealing with the controversial and unresolved
problem of European political identity.
2. This horizon of expectations, highly demanding on a plane of
ideal proclamations, is built on the ‘constitutional language of rights’
and on the guidelines of the future European polity, questioning in
the end the grand récit of the democracies of the Continent. A few
words seem necessary in order to clarify what the narrative affirma-
tion of distinctive loyalties is with respect to political identity. The
symbolic core, and the structure of the narration that has so far sup-
ported the claims to legitimacy of the European democracies, is both
for the Union and for any modern political identity, the idea that a
community must and can decide effectively its own destiny (Henry
2000). This idea implies an intergenerational link of a certain kind, in
which successive generations are in a close relation of continuity,
which is, moreover, consciously acknowledged by those who are part
of it. The narration of all is judged by individuals as being character-
ized by events in which they have taken part with action or memory,
and whose legitimising function they do not intend to renounce. The
past and the future are linked in a narration that is both a foundation
and a claim, of an elevated symbolic significance, in the following
sense: such a narration does not deny or manipulate in any way the
actuality and reality of the events that occurred, it simply establishes
that their particular character, considered foundational and binding
for the future, is something that must in no way be forgotten (Ass-
man 1992: 77-78). Such an aspect concerns identity more than
modernity or democracy. The distinctively democratic element re-
sides in the fact that the community is of free and equal individuals,
an identity-generating feature that has transformed the dimensions of
solidarity and belonging in the contemporary state turning them into
claims that are universally recognized to the holders of rights. A spe-
cific tradition has contributed to the consolidation of the grand récit
characterizing the European democracies. According to this tradition
civil, political and social rights are the internally homogeneous core
of citizenship, and as such they are what characterizes the status of
4 Note that the description of such a process follows the stages that have marked
the transformation in an increasingly abstract, reflexive and formal direction of modern
identity, both individual and group.
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citizen in the societies of the Union and, moreover, of most of Eu-
rope. The key to understanding the category is probably out-dated,
but is still very influential in the political culture of many Europeans,
constituting its mythic-symbolic récit, that narrative which, innovat-
ing itself after the proclamation of the Charter in Nice, has imparted
a strong impulse to the «process of political construction of the
Union» (Bourlot and Parsi 2001). 
As is well known, the English sociologist Marshall and his school
had contributed significantly to consolidating the meaning of citizen-
ship as a unitary ‘denominator’ of the holders of several categories of
rights; it (citizenship) includes civil, political and social rights. In gen-
eral terms, it is a formula for classifying heterogeneous elements, each
of which indicates a set of rights, and makes it possible to identify the
category of subjects endowed with them. According to Marshall, the
various classes of rights have all sprung from the epochal process that
began with the Enlightenment, and consisted in the progressive
crumbling of the ancien régime and the consequent extension of the
spheres of rights acknowledged by the political authority for increas-
ingly broad groups of citizens. The periods of transition occurred
within the liberal, first, then democratic, institutional framework, but
always within the confines of the nation-state4. Those who inaugurat-
ed the tradition of Anglo-Saxon studies on citizenship, evidently
transfused into it much of the optimism that characterized the phase
of expansion, believed then to be irreversible, of the British welfare
state. The holders of social rights, in a certain sense guaranteed by the
practicability of the path undertaken by the supporters of modernity,
found themselves, within such a framework, at the apex of the
process of emancipation, at the extremes of which we find, on the one
hand, subjects deprived of rights and, on the other, citizens enjoying
the broadest range of rights, compatible with the fair and effective
distribution of collective resources of an advanced democracy. 
Having said this, and at least from the point of view of empirical
observation, it can be stated that social rights are mentioned in the
constitutional charters of the majority of democratic countries, the
European in particular; as such, they have been recognized by the so-
cial Charters adopted by the Community and the Council of Europe,
5 This divarication is destined to become more acute, if, as is happening at the
level of proclamation of principles in Europe, the so-called third and fourth generation
rights (ecological and bioethical, rights to the protection of personal data, of con-
sumers, of children, of the disabled, of the old) are taken up in that number of those
demands for protection (of property, or of situations) that are deserving of recognition
and legal safeguards. 
6 There are three reasons adopted by Barbalet and shared by Zolo (1994: 1) social
rights are not rights because of their different structure with respect to civil and politi-
cal rights, entitlement to which involves the an active faculty of exercise on the part of
individuals, and against the state, while in the case of social rights those entitled are pas-
sive beneficiaries of services provided by the state. 2) With respect to civil and political
rights, in their universal and formal essence, social rights are demands for concrete ac-
tions, and therefore particularistic and selective, a circumstance that gives rise to the
subordination of their implementation to binding economic conditions, and to the dis-
cretionality of the administrations. 3) Finally, and further proof of the fact that we are
not talking about rights, the prejudicing of these would not be judiciable (Rodotà con-
tests however the general character of the assertion). Rodotà in Zolo (1994: 303-304). 
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and also proclaimed as an integral component – of equal status to all
the others – of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. Furthermore, without wishing to go into the question of their
effectiveness, at least the oldest social rights (to health, to social secu-
rity, to trade union and industrial rights) belong, to use Bobbio’s ter-
minology, to the second generation of rights of citizenship (while civil
and political rights are said to belong to the first); it is the new rights
(including bioethical and environmental) that make up the most nov-
el showcases, still in the process of normative and legal consolidation.
It seems however clear that there are two different and incompati-
ble kinds of logic within the notion of citizenship, the competitive
logic of economic rights and the cooperative and solidaristic logic of
social rights5. Among scholars there are those who are in favour of
limiting the notion of citizenship to civil and political rights and aban-
doning the phrase «social rights» in favour of that of «services», in
that the presumed social rights consist in conditional opportunities
for the effective exercise of other categories of rights6. Even the sup-
porters of such a position are not so much concerned with re-assess-
ment of the emancipative role of social rights (or opportunities) in the
global political context after 1989 as they are with finding an objec-
tive viewpoint with regard to the changing situation, in the attempt to
acquire some theoretical basis for recovering an operative dimension
for politics in advanced democracies. In the West, these are the insti-
tutional arrangements most exposed to the transformations of the le-
gal framework guaranteeing these rights, transformations brought
7 Multinational companies, movements of opinion, pacifist, ecologist and human-
itarian organizations, associations of citizens and consumers, pressure groups, press
agencies, churches and religious sects, supranational organizations, terroristic networks
and legal orders. 
8 The multiplication of crises and their expansive potential, that is, the capacity to
involve the major powers and other legal actors, whether of the state or not, through
the so-called «operations of international policing» put into effect by the supranational
organisms existing today, is in any case based on an overall figure that includes the phe-
nomena that the actors have to deal with, – at whatever decision-making level they find
themselves.
9 It has been maintained for a decade now that a notion of democratic citizenship
freed of the more serious theoretical difficulties should help to focus on the tension ex-
isting between the protection of rights guaranteed by the constitutional state and the
problems of globalisation, «which make the effective enjoyment of them depend in-
creasingly on the possibility of their international protection» (Zolo 1994: X). Citizen-
ship proves to be a point of equilibrium, nowadays increasingly precarious, between
the reasons of belonging to a concrete collective identity, and the reasons of universally
conceived rights, i.e. the totality of political, legal, ethical rights and obligations, spring-
ing from the anthropological image (profoundly modern and European) of an individ-
ual with free and autonomous attributes. It might be concluded that the rights of citi-
zenship, traditionally coinciding with the rights of participation in the deliberative ac-
tivities of a community of a territorially delimited character, presupposes an equally
limited notion of solidarity, that can be applied solely to «peers». The division of bene-
fits in terms of well-being and the security that results from it depend in the final analy-
sis on the will of the community itself to recognize certain individuals as its own mem-
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about by migratory flows, as well as by capital investments and finan-
cial flows. On the one hand, the number of rights holders is on the in-
crease, as are the instances of collisions between different legal orders
and principles, even if co-existing in one particular geographical enti-
ty. On the other, the progressive erosion of national sovereignty (not
only fiscal), facilitated by the new centres of influence that are active
both at regional level and at a supranational level7, complicates the
physiognomy of the complex world context following 1989 (Beck
1993)8. The political entity traditionally cloaked in the summa potes-
tas in the West, the nation-state, has historically been the first to suf-
fer from the proliferation of actors that hold in check at various levels
its claims to unquestioned superiority on vital questions: peace, secu-
rity, the protection of the rights of its own citizens and, to a no lesser
degree, of «guest workers». This is true the more so if such a state
bases its own legitimacy on a liberal and democratic form of govern-
ment, and on a consolidated system of social protection that enables
the citizens to enjoy effectively the opportunities offered to them by
formally sanctioned rights9.
bers and to exclude others. The characteristic democratic identity for the European so-
cieties of the present is not antithetical with respect to supranational identity, which
will be able to establish relations of synergy with the national identities. 
10 What we are talking about is the bond of identity that, without the aid of sym-
bols linked to the presumed and imagined unity of the people, could never have re-
placed in a stable and lasting form the preceding, more restricted and fragmented loy-
alties of the past: of family, of clan, of guild, of village, of dynasty. It is interesting to
note how Habermas (1996), with whose overall institutional solution one must not nec-
essarily agree, establishes a parallelism between the situation of (western) Europe to-
day, and that in which the European peoples found themselves in the last century; they
were at the same time objects and subjects of processes of symbolic, more than institu-
tional, elaboration, conducted in the light of the unifying idea of nation by the respec-
tive intellectual elites. These operated in such a way as to set at the centre of the public
sphere, for purposes of institutional integration, the real or presumed origins and desti-
nations, that were declared common to all social strata and classes, so as to reappraise
significantly (or sublimate into a higher synthesis) the differences from the «ancien
régime». From then on, nations have become, as modern forms of politics, the sources
of power to bestow upon a class of individuals the title of citizens, excluding others
from the enjoyment of the benefits deriving from it, and at the same time exempting
them from the corresponding duties. 
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3. As for the symbolic narration that has so far legitimated Euro-
pean politics, it can be said that it has justified national (more than
democratic) belonging on the basis of the positive valorisation of
sharing, of solidarity rights reserved for citizens10. It is in this particu-
lar sense that we should understand both the exemplariness, typical
of Western Europe, of the union between nation-state, welfare and
democracy and the problematic aspect of such a combination rebus
sic stantibus. This is valid as long as the nation-state is the only ful-
crum of reference for the ascription of belonging with respect to the
whole range of constitutionally recognized rights at the level of Euro-
pean polity. In some member states social rights are still referable to
this selective identity filter, while in others (German Federal Repub-
lic) this is not the case. The same empirical evidence contradicts the
Marshallian récit, denying, that is, that social rights can in themselves
be considered a natural and painless expansion of the notion, which
is indeed selective, of political citizenship. The preliminary question
that needs to be faced is that of the models of citizenship that under-
lie the systems of inclusion (not only material, but cultural and so-
cial). According to the model – either permanent assimilation or tem-
porary intercultural coexistence – the connections and the reciprocal
effects of the various classes of rights with respect to their effective
enjoyment by the beneficiaries are modified (Zincone 2001). But this
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question is outside the scope of this contribution. It is enough to re-
call its importance with respect to the discussion about the different
categories of rights, which, precisely, are not separate segments, but
capacities and entitlements in a mutual equilibrium with respect to
the type of citizen that appears today, when what is at stake is a state
entity that is much more exposed than in the past to the effects and
repercussions of the situations in which the economies and social sys-
tems in all the other parts of the globe find themselves. The migratory
flows and the conditions of fair treatment of the non-citizens and/or
new citizens are not phenomena to be dealt with sectorially with re-
spect to broader political visions, and therefore highly demanding
with respect to the commitment to democratic accountability in con-
crete policies, the only ones able to fulfil the commitments already as-
sumed in the two prologues, of the Charter and of the Constitution,
and re-affirmed in the text (Parts I and II) in the form of declarations
of principle. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights represented an important pas-
sage towards the constitutional protection of the whole range of
rights. The reason is in the declaration of indivisibility of social rights
with respect to civil and political rights. With respect to the procla-
mation of merely economic rights, a proclamation that has at least un-
til today marked the history of the process of integration and of the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the Charter, incorpo-
rated into the Draft Constitution, made clear the equal rank of the
categories of rights. On this point, however, there are authoritative
dissenting voices, as has been said. The Charter enunciates a relatively
limited number of social rights, not mentioning the right to work, to
fair pay, to housing (De Schutter, in Zagrebelsky 2004). One cannot,
moreover, ignore the malicious interpretations concerning the procla-
mations of indivisibility of rights, according to which the latter reflect
an evasive will or a compromise-seeking indecision of the drafters
with respect to the hierarchy of the categories of rights, criticisms that
touch in particular the case of social rights (Grimm, in Zagrebelsky
2004). These, independently of the treatment reserved for them in
Part III of the Constitution, and to the already explicit references in
the Charter to «national laws and practices», in actual fact depend on
economic constraints and on the policies of the governments, in that
they contain prescriptions, requests to perform addressed to the sin-
gle states; the latter are certainly obliged to provide the services nec-
essary for the achievement of the constitutional end, but the mandate
46 Identity and Rights
might be resolved in recommendations remitted to the will of the or-
dinary legislator, who hypothetically could act with full discretionary
power, except for the unlawfulness of the total abrogation of entire
areas of regulation on the subject with which the Charter deals at
length, in the chapters entitled «Equality» and «Solidarity». Nobody
can, however, deny that, according to the letter of the law, the Charter
has acknowledged that social rights have the equivalent legal status to
that of civil and political rights, proclaiming, in the clearest possible
way, their legal enforceability, that is, the faculty and capacity of the
competent judge to guarantee respect of them.
The even more delicate question, on which, from a textual point of
view, it is difficult not to agree, concerns what might be called a ‘struc-
tural’ restriction of the scope of rights expressed in the Charter, a limi-
tation that already seems to have been devised at a constitutional level
with regard to both the subject and the method, in the context of Part
III, on the organization and on the functioning of the polity «Union».
Looking at the merits, in Part III of the Constitution, social policies
are the object of a non-general competence that is restrictive and ex-
cludes harmonization among the states. With respect to the decision-
making method, unanimity has been maintained, with the following
onerous consequence: when it is a question of policies that are partic-
ularly delicate because they determine the levels and modes of provi-
sion and enjoyment of social services, and an agreement is not
reached, then the power is not exercised (Allegretti 2003). The direct
reference to the preceding Treaties, which are in formulation and con-
tents much less ambitious than the mandate conferred on the Conven-
tion by the declaration of Laeken, marks a step backwards or at least it
might consign to an excessively careful slowness the dynamics in other
respects recognized in the same text, dynamics which tend towards
the achievement of a «coordinated strategy», for example, of employ-
ment policies (Constitution, III-107). With respect to these criticisms
it can be said that on the one hand, certainly, the constitutional rank of
such prescriptions chains and binds social, fiscal and budgetary poli-
cies to a much less flexible and ductile legislative source than are the
ordinary legislations of the states on matters of social policy. On the
other hand, the constitutional rank in terms of subject and power is
conferred on provisions concerning matters that are crucial for the
purpose of a gradual settling down onto «minimum prescriptions» of
all the systems of welfare of the Union, beginning with the more criti-
cal conditions regarding environment, work conditions, social security
11 Authoritative voices (Habermas 1996) invite us not to consider fulfilled the pre-
dictions concerning the inevitable decline of the peculiar forms of European politics,
nor to consider the potentialities for redefinition of the «rules of the allocative and re-
distributive “game” to be exhausted: indeed it is necessary to re-examine more closely
the specific features – we are talking about western democracies with a high standard
of social protection – before proceeding to describing the effects, real or presumed,
that are exercised on this type of order by economic and technological processes linked
to the expression “globalisation”». 
12 It does not regard the right to property in that it is ius excludendi alios, but
rather the precondition for acquiring goods as property (Ferrajoli in Zolo 1994: 270).
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and protection of workers. The commitment undertaken can be effec-
tive and binding for the states only if it is really within their reach or if
the Union undertakes programmatically and politically to reduce the
more serious imbalances.
Indeed, only if the priority of the fulfilment of rights declared indi-
visible were taken seriously would it be possible to envisage program-
matically at community level the possibility of making the enjoyment
of social rights less dependent on the budgetary conditions of the sin-
gle member states. As a further consequence, it would be possible to
broaden the community and the political identity-oriented allegiance,
while concealing the material limits to the extension of such rights11.
Reducing the rights guaranteed unconditionally by the states of the
Union to the rights of the person (life, physical and psychic integrity,
equal opportunity12, habeas corpus, rights to opinion, to movement, to
confidentiality of correspondence, of residence) seems to some schol-
ars to be a sensible and practicable path to tread; it would be neither
over-ambitious or deceptive, nor would it, as a result of this, inhibit the
achievement of other levels of citizenship in more adequate politico-in-
stitutional spheres, paradoxically the spheres in which must be situated
the loyalties to the wider and more inclusive body politic, and there-
fore equidistant with respect to the requirements of those endowed
with the whole range of constitutionally sanctioned rights. The vari-
ability of resources, of the ways of framing social needs and entitle-
ments, the differences between the welfare regimes themselves within
Europe require at the same time a vision and a compensation at Union
level – at least for arbitration and coordination if not for common poli-
cy – in key matters for the satisfaction of social rights. The method of
«coordination of action», re-affirmed in the Constitution (III-107), re-
volves round the emanation of community guide lines that tend to pro-
mote intersecting learning processes among a plurality of institutional
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actors operating in agreement, but autonomously (De Angelis 2004).
Social rights, because they are of equal rank but of different struc-
ture from the other two classes, need Europe and the Union in that it
is an entity of supranational rank and macro-regional dimension that
does not replace, but rather completes and orientates in a non-discor-
dant way the actions of the states answering to the needs of the citi-
zens. The result would be that the same critical positions with respect
to the virtues of the Charter and the Constitutional text re-assess the
political dynamics of negotiation, of compromise, of conflict regulat-
ed at an institutional level as the privileged context for guaranteeing
the effective functioning of the polity «Union».
The priority is political and programmatic; ‘interiorisation’ is need-
ed, or a realization that much of the future of the institutions depends
on policies that have been agreed on along community guidelines.
This would also be true in the event of a failure of the process of rati-
fication of the Constitution, an event that would mark indelibly the
possibilities of legal enforceability of the Charter, and would certainly
lead to very damaging repercussions in the process of integration and
legitimation of the polity «Union». In any case, just as failure would
have potentially destabilising consequences for the whole politico-in-
stitutional fabric of the Union, so the ratification of the constitutional
text would not automatically correct the situations of painful friction
between having to be and being, i.e. between the legal dictate and the
effective conformity to all the requisites necessary for the granting
and lasting appropriation of the aquis communitaire, on the part of
the real societies of the countries newly admitted.
It is not possible to forget that a healthy dialectic between inclusion
and exclusion is brought about and strengthened by the «official»
proclamation of European identity in terms of a dynamic and non-hier-
archical equilibrium among rights, such a model being connected to a
notion of citizenship that is neither sectorial nor static, but rather
propulsive and emancipatory, not over-ambitious but effective. In this
last sense, there are again some analogies with what has been so far de-
fined as the grand récit of European citizenship. The same difficulties
of interpretation and application that have recently become manifest,
and which will certainly complicate the instances and will not facilitate
the jurisprudence of the Courts (Strasbourg, Luxemburg, the national
courts) show exactly what is meant by a richer, more dynamic and
complex notion of European citizenship than that already envisaged by
the Treaty of Maastricht; the process of consolidation and definition, of
13 By stereotypes is meant crystallisations of characteristics with a high level of
simplification, a high degree of tendentiousness and of homogeneity, that some (ob-
servers) attribute to ‘someone else’, different from him/herself or his/her own kind, a
‘someone else’ that is important or considered such for the observers in that he/she ex-
emplifies a group or category (target group) which they fear or from whom they expect
alien and therefore harmful behaviour. From the point of view of the observers, ‘homo-
geneity’ means that the stereotype is broadly shared by them. From the point of view of
the object observed, ‘ homogeneity’ means that the characteristics attributed are be-
lieved to be generalized to all or almost all the components of the target group.
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putting into effect already formally recognized rights makes the tradi-
tional approach to the subject of citizenship denser and specifically
emancipates it from a mere reduction to the question of formal inclu-
sion or exclusion, of being or not being endowed with rights. The
question of the mere entitlement to rights should be retranslated into
the rather more complex question of the quality and the relative im-
portance of these rights with respect to the capacity to activate them
on the part of the holders of rights, in other words of the question of
real disparities, asymmetries, structural and potentially permanent in-
equalities. Often immigrants and, even more so, the new citizens, who
can exhibit the credentials of European citizenship over the whole ter-
ritory of the Union, do not effectively enjoy the set of proclaimed
rights. It is not just a matter of phenomena of racism and xenophobia
spreading in certain regions of Europe, but equally of other manifesta-
tions of hostility and verbal and non-verbal discrimination, apparently
inoffensive, but really quite pernicious and pervasive (because critically
not controlled by those responsible), which are potentially erosive of
the bases of cohesion and liberal and democratic responsibility. The or-
dinary citizen is induced – by habits, attitudes, amply consolidated and
accredited messages of widespread consumption – to resort to biting,
injurious stereotypes to classify ‘foreigners’ (even more so if not pros-
perous and therefore needful of benefits). What counts is simply the
negative definition of stereotype, and its immediate relevance to rela-
tions between human groups13. As a result of the use of stereotypes,
tendentious behaviour involves the axiomatic and non-revisable ascrip-
tion of negative qualities to all the components of such a group, which
in this way is stigmatised once and for all, and with extremely narrow
margins of manoeuvre for the individuals of which the group is com-
posed. In the face of obvious cases of individual divergences from the
stereotype used by the observers to penalize the group, recourse is
made to the sophism of exceptionality, so as not to facilitate osmosis or
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dynamics of interchange between groups, let alone processes of inte-
gration.
To these elements, not necessarily linked to an actual discriminato-
ry intention towards the target groups of stereotypes, but nonetheless
presaging subordinacy, should be added one even more decisive and
comprehensive than the preceding ones. As the gender studies have
already suggested with respect to women, institutions, legal forms, the
practices of regulation and attribution of costs and benefits dominant
in the community that hosts migrant foreigners, and the actual struc-
ture of rights with which they are forced to live, have been conceived
by someone else or for someone else. These «ill-fitting» rights have
been formulated in a foreign language, expression of a different cul-
ture, of daily practices that require competences that are not merely
linguistic, and therefore sometimes obscure, ambiguous and impene-
trable for the «non-initiated». The communicative and pragmatic in-
competence simply confirm the inadequacy and dissimilarity with re-
spect to the ‘healthy’ model of interaction that the observers have in
mind, and from which the stigmatised individuals are removed. It is
on these difficulties – already observed and analysed by those who are
concerned with the different kinds of structural asymmetry among
groups – that the definition of denizens, so well fitting to such cir-
cumstances, is constructed. Passing from the formal recognition to
the effective exercise and enjoyment of rights by those endowed does
not belong to the definitions of the doctrine of virtue, but to that of
the doctrine of right, it is not a question of benevolence, but of the
fair application of constitutional laws. On such an effective applica-
tion rests the legitimacy of any order that is inspired by the constitu-
tional principle, as is also the Union «of 25», which is active and re-
sponsible before its own citizens not only through the mediation of
activity of the states. Certain factors of democratic functionality, pres-
ent if not strikingly obvious, cannot be ignored. The institutional and
political result that we have before us is as much the fruit of fifty
years of diplomatic negotiations conducted with intergovernmental
methods, as the precipitate of politically binding expressions of popu-
lar will (the elections of the European Parliament, the referendums);
these, which are institutionalised expressions of assent or dissent,
while not being effective from the point of view of the direct bond of
democratic responsibility – European citizens do not have the power
to condition through the elections of the Parliament the structure and
composition of the Commission – do not however conflict with the
14 Even those who have a preference for the lexis of political identity (European,
in particular), of which the semantic areas of reference should be specified, might hope
that, in the near future, the Union will become a responsible political actor in its own
right, and capable of intervening in international affairs without producing negative
repercussions on the societies and economies of the member states, meaning by this the
standards of living and of social protection effectively enjoyed by the beneficiaries. This
seems plausible, even before more sophisticated questions present themselves, such as
those relative to the role of civilian power, having specific imperatives that are both
functional and juridical, which could push the Union to continue the progressive en-
largement towards the East until some components of the so-called ‘circle of friends’
are included fatally (for some) in its own orbit. It is not necessary to venture onto this
elusive ground, to understand that it is absolutely not possible to relegate the issue of
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democratic principle, in its broad sense: elections and referendums
are the channels through which democratically elected governments,
the same that conducted the diplomatic initiatives, signed and ratified
the treaties, are supported and confirmed in their decisions. Again
here it is a question of politically motivated and politically articulated
choices, made by actors whose democratic investiture is not in ques-
tion. This does not deny, but rather specifies the criticisms directed at
identifying the democratic deficit of the Union as a polity that ad-
vances direct claims to recognition of identity by its citizens. 
4. It is not so much a matter of disowning or repressing national
identities, towards which a sense of belonging has long existed (with
differences from nation to nation), as of harmonizing the different
levels and the different historical vicissitudes of political and legal cul-
tures, of loyalties, of rights, of duties within the polity «Union». On
the one hand, it cannot be ignored that many of the initiatives intend-
ed to consolidate the collective perception of belonging to the Union
– although oriented not in a chauvinistic, but a liberal and democratic
sense – are not facilitated by the progressive inclusion of new compo-
nents, of countries distinguished by strongly heterogeneous politico-
cultural traditions and practices with respect to the countries that are
already members. On the other hand, the demands coming from this
side of the political agenda are increasing, in ever wider sectors of the
European population, the awareness of what is non-renounceable for
«us», and what is, on the other hand, intolerable – the uncertainty of
the law, administrative abuse, the police state, discrimination, torture,
state terrorism, and, last but not least, the death penalty – contribut-
ing to the spread of the conviction that a common European identity
is not a chimera, but something already perceptible and institutionally
the extension to the new states to merely ‘technical’ problems, almost as if it did not
closely concern the ‘dense’ problem of the identity of a voluntary political association,
that has given itself rules and objectives of peaceful and just coexistence, as is the case
of the Union.
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operative14. Think of what has been the definition (and the verifica-
tion) of the conditions for entry of the aspiring states, among which
an important role was played by the existence of an admittedly rela-
tive homogeneity of a constitutional nature regarding rights, the prin-
ciple of legality and of the democratic development of institutions has
had a vital role. In other words, the corpus (however exiguous) of the
distinctive qualities of a common European identity is written largely
in terms of a culture of rights. The jarring and problematical fact is
that, even at the more elementary level of perception of identity, such
a sensibility, sometimes strongly reactive to violations, does not neces-
sarily imply the acceptance of a fixed and predetermined hierarchy of
the classes of claims deserving protection (civil rights, political rights,
social rights, beside the most recent case of the rights of the new gen-
eration). This is perhaps the sign of an insurmountable difficulty for
common sense as well as for the class of professional jurists, symptom
of a fluidity of axiological attitudes, which has found confirmation in
the very formulations of the Charter, until today cogent and enforce-
able constitutional law, but nonetheless loaded with ambiguity with
respect to the priorities of application. If this is true, and if a radically
negative evaluation is given of the juridical contribution of the Char-
ter with respect to social rights, the problem of the solidaristic ap-
proach, and as such characterizing European identity would now be
more intricate than ever. The supranational level invoked previously
to make up for the unkept promises of the national democracies with
respect to the rights of solidarity would be, if not eluded, at least con-
siderably weakened.
It is however illusory to think that it is possible to resolve the diffi-
culties of democratic representation of the member states by limiting
ourselves to proposing once again at a supranational level a model
that, as we have seen, is already in difficulty at a state level, and be-
cause of the complex of problems that day by day become increasing-
ly «global». The structure, internally differentiated according to level
of competence of the modes of political decision – as can be seen in
the European polity – might be confirmed as a neither occasional nor
temporary model for the institutional structure of the Union, provid-
15 The example of France shows how the bold universalistic defence of the lay na-
ture of the state often conflicts with the second principle, of tolerance of differences,
despite the consolidated experiences and habit of coexistence with cultures and popu-
lations of North Africa. 
16 There is no doubt that accepting the Pact of stability (and the relative sanctions
for the states that exceed the threshold of 3 percent of the deficit/GNP relation) con-
stituted a fundamental stage in the process of institutional transformation; the states, in
fact, undersigned a massive loss of sovereignty in favour of the supranational instance.
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ed that the opaque aspects are eliminated from it to the maximum de-
gree, and increased those of openness to the public, of transparency
and of accountability of the single institutions for their actions. Such
an objective cannot be reached without the continuous activity of the
social actors that are committed at a supranational level to the cre-
ation of a European civil society, the absence of which is lamented or
even feared by many. In order to contrast the undesirable aspects of
the general framework, the European Union will have to constitute a
form of regional integration congenial to relations of tolerance, and
also have the aspirations and potentialities to transform itself into a
«civil power» (Telò 1999), that intends to consolidate uniformly the
empire of law. To achieve both of these things, coexistence of differ-
ences and universal guarantee of the rule of law15, the Union will have
prove itself able to reduce conflicts, exhibiting in routine political and
administrative practice – and not only in high-sounding declarations
of principle – a clear sensitivity to rights side by side with tolerance
towards cultural differences, as well as a vocation for the correction
of the more serious social inequalities, with the means that only an in-
stitutionally consolidated macro-regional reality can have at its dis-
posal.
In conclusion, we will not deal with the issue of the progressive
weakening – neither planned nor wished for – of the very sources of
legitimation of the national states; while it should be confirmed that
the economic and above all monetary union achieved in Europe has
already eroded the sovereignty of the states in favour of the suprana-
tional instance, on which in the future delicate decisions regarding re-
distribution are incumbent. There are already considerable limits to
the margins of manoeuvre of the national governments regarding eco-
nomic and financial matters, and they are of a permanent nature16. It
was certainly a question of constraints imposed on the states by a log-
ic of adaptation, which has tried and is trying to anticipate and sup-
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port the functional imperatives of the market. In any case, it must be
recognized that the constraints deriving from the economic sphere
have exercised a powerful accelerating effect on political integration.
We have further examples in the events linked to the enlargement to
the east. Let us not forget how the onerous obligations imposed in
Copenhagen were accepted obtorto collo by the candidate countries,
and with all the limits gradually absorbed by their respective legal or-
ders, to make competitive, in a homogeneous and integrated way, the
national economic contexts within the much wider area of free ex-
change constituted by the Union.
However, as for the events of the first fifty years of the process of
integration, so also in this case it would be reductive to limit oneself
to considerations of a functionalistic kind, above all for the reasons of
heterogeneity of the institutional and identity-related traditions to
which reference was made, which require appropriate, far-sighted
modes of political intervention, aimed at the coexistence of differ-
ences in the constitutional spirit. It is not for accessory, but for sub-
stantial, reasons that at present important projects for the creation of
employment policies and common social policies are being discussed
at the level of community and intergovernmental institutions: these
policies are among the few that are able to realize in practice, and not
in high-sounding declarations of principle, that common European
space (now composed of 25 ‘fellows’) characterized by the principles
of equal dignity and solidarity of which the Charter speaks. Beside
the limitation, imposed on the margin of intervention of the states,
now the creative potential of the political power must be asserted,
strengthened as it is thanks to the transfer of specific and vital compe-
tences of economic and political orientation by the states to the
Union.
The promises formulated in terms of the constitutional principle of
solidarity could not be maintained effectively without a previous re-
distribution among the various institutional instances, on the basis of
differentiated territorial extension, of specific costs and competences
in social matters, a redistribution that could produce ex parte popoli
a multi-level social citizenship, which does not replace, but supple-
ments and completes the national social citizenship. We already see a
divarication between belonging to a national community and (specif-
ic) rights, as is demonstrated by the fact that the status of resident
and worker is a sufficient requisite for the enjoyment of social rights.
If these have constituted an important factor of integration within the
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national democracies, it is only legitimate to ask what the adequate
ways are not so much to achieve through rights a single, unitary Euro-
pean social citizenship, as to make possible different combinations of
social contexts which however intersect on a shared nucleus of rights
and duties, equal with respect to the level of fairness, efficiency and
sustainability attained. 
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